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the kind of work that must go forward. It can and must go forward 
in a number of different ways-through historical studies, especially 
of the founding and the fourteenth amendment, through studies of 
the contemporary Court, and through more philosophic investiga-
tion into the nature of interpretation of the sort Dworkin has so 
interestingly undertaken. 
KERMIT HALLI2 
The Bicentennial has come and gone, and like other such great 
national anniversaries it has produced a legacy of both popular 
schlock and scholarly substance. Recently, we have seen published 
several new books on events at the Philadelphia Convention, a won-
derful (if windy) work by Michael Kammen on the cultural history 
of the Constitution, Forrest McDonald's breathless (and sometimes 
historically controverted) examination of the intellectual roots of 
the document, Philip Kurland and Ralph Lerner's poorly organized 
The Founders' Constitution, and a badly needed edition of Herbert 
Storing's The Complete Anti-Federalist. There have also been nu-
merous special issues of history, political science, and law journals 
devoted to some aspect of the constitutional order. Project '87, 
under the relentless leadership of James McGregor Bums and Rich-
ard B. Morris, succeeded in typical academic fashion in plodding in 
dull ways over mostly arid scholarly ground, although it did man-
age, through This Constitution, to persuade academics to produce 
clearly written articles shorn of the usual mumbo-jumbo trappings 
that accompany so much scholarly writing about the document. 
The times being such as they were, the political Right had the 
good fortune of being able to make its arguments about original 
intent during a year when public and scholarly attention was al-
ready given over to what the framers intended. The Straussians 
have enlivened recent constitutional debate, although their preten-
sions to revealed historical truth have a hollow ring. Moreover, we 
should be glad, as scholars, for Attorney General Edwin Meese, 
since he provided such a convenient target for attacking much of 
the simple-mindedness that surrounded the Bicentennial. The anti-
Meese literature has grown apace, and with it has come a new ap-
preciation for the indeterminacy and ideological cast of so much of 
the scholarship on the Constitution. Given the nature of our polity, 
it is probably a healthy sign that scholars of all political persuasions 
believe that they are right about the Constitution's meaning, even if 
12. Professor of Law, University of Florida. 
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it is to argue, as do the Critical Legal Studies advocates, that it has 
no meaning at all. 
Yet the Bicentennial hardly unleashed a fire storm of historical 
revelation. We are not much further along the road toward under-
standing our constitutional system's history than we were in the 
early 1900s when the celebratory and scholarly machinery was first 
cranked up. The Bicentennial has evoked some good but no great 
scholarship on the history of the Constitution. At a time when his-
torians in other fields are racing ahead methodologically and inter-
pretively, far too many constitutional historians are viewed as 
curmudgeons sorting through the detritus of the Philadelphia Con-
vention, its luminaries, and a few great Supreme Court cases. That 
smart people can write good books that do not tell us much new 
(and that most scholars in other fields ignore) offers a cautionary 
tale to future generations of constitutional historians. There is 
much to be said for being a contrarian in scholarship, and certainly 
we have to have command of the technical and internal workings of 
constitutional law. Yet there is no doubt that, if constitutional his-
torians are to have an impact on the larger world of historical schol-
arship and of the study of the Constitution, they are going to have 
to pay much more attention to the history of public law in action 
rather than gnashing their teeth reverentially over what James 
Madison, George Mason, and Alexander Hamilton intended. 
More than a half-century ago, James G. Randall urged consti-
tutional historians to probe the social history of the nation's ruling 
document, and for more than a quarter century James Willard 
Hurst and the Wisconsin school of socio-legal historians have been 
showing the way in which private law and social and economic de-
velopment have gone hand-in-hand. Yet students of the history of 
public law, especially law professors and political scientists who 
have largely claimed the field of constitutional history, have resisted 
such a behavioral approach, preferring the tried (and tired) practice 
of doctrinal inquiry. Political scientists have rediscovered (remem-
ber Corwin, Swisher, and Mason!) "longitudinal" studies, but they 
remain blissfully ignorant of the difference between analyzing some-
thing in the past and making historical sense of change over time. 
The scholarship of Paul Murphy, Harold Hyman, Harry Scheiber, 
and Stanley Kutler, all of whom are historians rather than lawyers, 
is strikingly different in both its method of analysis and its mode of 
argument from the history practiced by political scientists and law 
professors. That difference in scholarly style ought, at the very 
least, to stir self-doubt among those in either group who have too 
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often confused putting Supreme Court cases in chronological order 
with doing history. 
The sad truth, however, is that much constitutional history, no 
matter the practitioner, is at something of a dead end. Or, to put 
the case in a more charitable way, much remains to be done, and it 
will not get done if we continue to limit ourselves to traditional 
sources, great Supreme Court cases, original intentions, and highly 
literate white males. Take, for example, the matter of state consti-
tutions, surely among the most important documents in the Ameri-
can constitutional tradition and the source of many innovations 
(e.g., female suffrage and prohibition) ultimately added to the fed-
eral charter. Even during the Bicentennial year, most scholars 
(both in writing and in endless displays as pundits) failed to make 
the simple connection between the first state constitutions and the 
work of the framers in 1787. We know, moreover, next to nothing 
historically about the operation of state bills of rights, and we per-
sist in treating the history of liberty as something that did not begin 
until the federal Bill of Rights was nationalized through the four-
teenth amendment. The history of state constitutions remains one 
of the most surprisingly barren fields of inquiry in American his-
tory, and one that the next generation of constitutional historians 
ought to pursue. These documents were crucial to the allocation of 
the costs, risks, and rewards of economic development, to the estab-
lishment of the nation's political culture, and to the organization of 
civil society. Nor do we know much, even with the pioneering ef-
forts of Robert Kagan and his collaborators, about the history of 
the highest courts of appeal in the states that interpreted these doc-
uments. We have only begun to plumb the process by which state 
regulatory bureaucracies were created, yet we all recognize today 
that the establishment of the administrative state, and with it a 
fourth branch of government, was one of the turning points in 
American history-not just constitutional history. 
Even when we move to the much more intensively studied fed-
eral constitutional system, the scene is too often one of scholars 
endlessly trolling the same familiar waters. The substantive re-
search agenda remains largely unfulfilled. Recall, for instance, that 
we have no broad interpretive history of federalism, although Harry 
Scheiber has given promise of writing one. There are no satisfac-
tory histories of many of the provisions of the Bill of Rights, includ-
ing such controversial issues as trial by jury, the right to bear arms, 
and the provisions of the tenth amendment. We still lack a consti-
tutional history of women and of Native Americans. Even many of 
the Supreme Court's most significant cases, such as McCulloch v. 
1988] SYMPOSIUM 41 
Maryland, and Justices, especially the conservative ones, lack the 
kind of detailed, yet methodologically innovative, monographic 
studies that are essential to a synthesis of our constitutional history. 
The case study, even with all of its defects of narrowness, re-
mains one of the most important ways of capturing the historical 
contingency of constitutional law. Yet too often a case study in 
constitutional history is just that-the study of a case. We have let 
ourselves be lulled into the idea that Court and Constitution are 
synonymous terms, but in the day-to-day operation of the constitu-
tional system that is simply not so, and it is the regular functioning 
of the constitutional processes outside the courts that deserves our 
attention in years to come. Students of the Constitution generally 
have distorted our understanding of the larger constitutional system 
by lavishing attention on only one part of it-the judicial process-
as if it were the constitutional process. The history of the presiden-
tial appointing power and its relationship to the Senate's duty to 
advise and consent, for example, is a muddle and the practice of 
senatorial courtesy begs for historical consideration. Far too many 
constitutional historians settle on one part of the constitutional pro-
cess (judicial review, congressional lawmaking, the executive's war-
making power) rather than attempting to view the process as a 
whole. What we need is an approach far more comprehensive in 
scope and much more attentive to non-judicial constitutional func-
tions. This means, as well, that constitutional historians are going 
to have to puzzle through more forcefully the relationship between 
public and private law and the institutions that support each of 
them. 
A final observation. The Critical Legal Studies movement has 
often been, like Gary McDowell and his right-wing counterparts, 
more ideological bluster than scholarship. Yet, just as conservatives 
correctly insist that intentions and precedents matter, CLS propo-
nents have been right to point us toward a constitutional history 
sensitive to the relationship between the legal/constitutional order 
and ecological modes of production. In short, constitutional his-
torians need to relearn the old lesson of the Progressive Era that 
economic interests often drive rather than are driven by ideological 
concerns. 
What we ought to be after is an understanding of the culture of 
constitutionalism in action. This Bicentennial season too often gave 
us ideological posturing overlaid with a pretentious veneer of histor-
ical certitude. If we continue along this course, constitutional his-
tory will remain right where it is-the butt of political opportunism 
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and an intellectual orphan to the behavioral revolution in historical 
methodology. 
ROBERT FAULKNERt3 
The next task for constitutional scholarship, it seems to me, 
remains the grand old task kept alive by a few scholars: taking the 
Constitution seriously. Preserving the general government in its 
constitutional vigor and limits, and individual rights in their Consti-
tutional extent, was long understood to be the constitutional duty of 
officials. It should also be the lodestar of American students of law 
and politics. So to speak in 1987, however, subjects one to bitter 
attacks, not to mention ridicule. An orientation by the original 
Constitution is repudiated in effect by a majority of the Supreme 
Court-and openly by most judges and scholars. It has become a 
party matter, and Attorney General Meese's exhortation to abide 
by original intent has evoked a torrent of indignant repudiation. 
Another sign: the Bicentennial seems unenthusiastically backed, 
awkwardly excused, and just plain embarrassing to most judges and 
legal scholars. It is something like the exhumation of a distin-
guished elder whom a zealous village establishment would like 
thought dead of natural causes. 
There continue to appear, of course, first-rate studies consider-
ing the prudent application of constitutional provisions. I think of 
Robert Scigliano's examination of "The War Powers Resolution 
and the War Powers" (in The Presidency in the Constitutional Order 
(J. Bessette & J. Tulis ed. 1981)), Robert Steamer's assessment of 
the Chief Justices (Chief Justice (1986), James W. Ceaser's Presi-
dential Selection (1979), and James Q. Wilson's "Does the separa-
tion of powers still work?" (The Public Interest, Winter 1987). If 
other scholars take such works as models, we should rejoice. 
There are grave obstacles to such a happy future, however. 
First and foremost is the dominant progressive scholarship of more 
than a half-century, which has declared obsolete the old constitu-
tionalism of limited government and equality of opportunity. It is 
now joined to a bastard relative disillusioned with progress and yet 
determined to progress beyond. Radical or rad-lib scholars are at 
once politically complacent, since they are assured that history has 
disposed of the merits of the old, and politically zealous or pecu-
liarly principled, since they suppose that equal dignity and libera-
tion are alone right and historically fitting. We face a scholarly mix 
of historical assurance and moral zealotry that inclines to corrode 
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